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Abstract 
Ever since the United States became a global power it seeked to preserve its hegemony 
in the strategically vital regions, including the Middle East. In order to secure regional 
hegemony in the region the United States has historically articulated three main strategic 
objectives: maintaining strong alliance relationships, limiting the influence of 
adversaries, and preserving a regional order. However, according to the thesis of this 
article, since the war on terrorism began, in the wake of the terror attacks of September 
11, 2001, some of the major strategic decisions taken by the United States, including its 
war in Iraq, the containment of Iran, its unconditional support for Israel, and incoherent 
policies regarding post-Arab-Spring Egypt and Syria undermined the above mentioned 
strategic objectives. In relation to these strategic setbacks and in light of the enormous 
costs the United States had to bear in recent years in connection to its strategy, Donald 
Trump campaigned for less American presence in the region. However, some structural 
components of US engagement towards the region and some enduring strategic interests 
suggest that there will not be any large scale disengagement from the Middle East.     
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Introduction 
Since the end of the Second World War active American presence in the strategically 
vital regions of the globe has been a cornerstone of the United-States-led global order. 
These strategically vital regions have been Western Europe and East Asia (because of 
their economic and military potential), and the Middle East due to its vast energy 
resources. Although the geopolitical attributes of the three regions have always differed 
significantly, American strategic objectives towards them were identical concerning three 
main components. The United States seeked to establish and maintain stable alliance 
partnerships, limit the influence of regional adversaries, and preserve the regional order. 
                                                          
1 Gergely Varga is non-resident researcher of the Center for Strategic and Defense Studies and the Institute 
for International Affairs and Trade. 
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These objectives became the foundations of American dominance in the Middle East, and 
secured its unique power in the region well into the post-Cold-War era. However, there 
have been an increasing number of signs – from the emergence of ISIS to Iran’s growing 
influence and Russia’s reentry into the region as a serious stakeholder – that the days of 
American hegemony in the region may be long gone. This paper argues that US strategy 
under the Bush and Obama administrations significantly contributed to this decline of 
American influence in the Middle East. Furthermore, despite the new Trump 
administration’s early pledges that it will significantly alter American strategy concerning 
the region, powerful structural factors will limit the scope of any significant change.       
 
The strategy of hegemonic primacy in the Middle East  
After the Second World War the United States became the leading external power in the 
Middle East. The above mentioned three general strategic objectives were gradually 
operationalized into three goals for the region: to maintain Israel’s strategic edge, to 
preserve American hegemony in the Persian Gulf (Haass, 2006: 1-2), and, increasingly 
from the 1990s, fighting terrorism (Oren, 2008: 574, 578). The Camp David accords in 
1978 secured America’s position as an indispensable actor in the Levant and cemented 
its relations with Israel. The Gulf War against Iraq in 1991 solidified relations with Arab 
monarchies in the Gulf and strengthened American military hegemony in the Persian Gulf 
and in the wider region (Terrill, 2006: 18-19). In addition, the United States has built 
strong security and defense relationships with an array of countries in the region.  
At the same time, the United States searched for ways to contain the influence of 
adversarial powers in the region. Since the Islamic revolution in 1979, Iran has been the 
premier foe of Washington in the region, but one of its main rivals, Iraq, was also 
considered to be a major threat for American interests until the Bush administration 
decided to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003. The United States articulated 
regional strategies which contained these regional powers and their proxies, such as the 
“Carter doctrine” of 1980 and the “dual containment” beginning in 1993 (Indyk et al, 
1994: 3). The close partnership and support for regional allies, the enforcement of 
international rules, underpinned by robust diplomatic and military presence, established 
an American-led regional order. Within this framework for decades the United States 
prioritized stability in the region, and as a result US hegemony seemed unchallenged on 
the eve of the new millennium. However, the vast American superiority and fear ignited 
G. VARGA  COJOURN 2:2-3 (2017) 
 
21 
 
by 9/11 invited such strategies during this period which not only resulted in strategic 
overreach, but gradually undermined America’s position in the region.  
During the decade between 2001 and the Arab Spring, US foreign policy focused 
on four major conflicts in the wider Middle East region, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
the Iranian nuclear issue and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This focus was not only 
specific for the Bush administration, but for the first two years of the Obama 
administration. Both administrations seeked to preserve American hegemony in the 
region by focusing American resources and attention on these conflicts. The Arab Spring 
in 2011 brought about a new political and security environment with new challenges for 
American interests in the region. As a result the focus shifted, initially towards Libya, 
then towards the war in Syria, while the Iranian nuclear issue remained an important 
element of U.S. engagement towards the region, and Iraq got back into the spotlight with 
the emergence of the self-declared Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014.  
 
The post-9/11 era: Strategic overreach 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks created a new context for the Bush administration to shift its 
strategy towards the region. Based on the presumption that authoritarian regimes 
throughout the region invited extremism and some of them posed a direct threat to 
American national security, the Bush administration elevated the concept of preemptive 
strike and ‘democracy export’ to policy, as demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
The war in Afghanistan started in October 2001 as narrowly defined regime 
change and, primarily, a counterterrorism operation (Rumsfeld, 2003), but gradually 
expanded into a long and costly nation-building project, culminating in President 
Obama’s surge strategy between 2010 and 2012. This long and costly engagement 
distracted American attention and resources away from more vital areas and issues. The 
removal of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq in the spring of 2003 and the subsequent 
US decisions ignited chaos and instability, and brought the country on the verge of all-
out civil war by 2007 (Cordesman, 2006: 276). Later, the Obama administration’s 
decision to follow up on the Bush administration’s promise that all American forces 
would leave Iraq by the end of 2011 contributed to the deteriorating domestic political 
and security situation after 2011 (Cordesman, 2015). The war did not only destabilize 
Iraq and strengthened extremist anti-American forces and terrorist organizations 
throughout the region, but gave a significant boost to the influence of Iran in Iraq and in 
the Middle East. 
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The Bush administration also articulated a forceful strategy towards Iran, 
especially after Tehran’s nuclear program began to take off in 2003. President Bush did 
not seek to negotiate to resolve its differences with the Iranian regime, but chose an all-
out forceful containment strategy (Meier 2013: 5-7). Although this strategy pleased some 
of America’s allies in the region, it weakened American positions as Iran was able to 
successfully retaliate on several different fronts in the Middle East, and it benefited from 
the anti-American perceptions of publics in the region (Balogh, 2013: 212). Although 
President Obama initially signaled more openness towards negotiations with Iran, he kept 
up similar pressure on Tehran during his first term, did not rule out the threat of the use 
of force, nor did he show much more room for compromise on the substantial questions 
of the nuclear issue (Parsi, 2012: 46-47). It was the combination of the international 
coalition Obama built to put pressure on Iran, the second Obama administration’s greater 
flexibility and the changes in the Iranian political leadership which together opened up 
the door towards the Iranian nuclear deal during Obama’s second term.   
The decades-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict remained an unresolved and 
potentially explosive issue throughout the whole period. Despite efforts by the Bush 
administration to revive the peace process, the administration gave Israel nearly 
unconditional support throughout its tenure concerning regional security issues and its 
approach towards the Palestinians by maintaining generous diplomatic and military 
support for Tel Aviv (Rostoványi, 2006: 203-205). Barack Obama’s initial statements 
directed towards the right wing, hawkish Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu 
seemed to imply a more balanced approach towards the two sides. However, the 
administration gradually backtracked from its claims concerning Israel’s controversial 
activities in the West Bank (Gerges, 2012: 120). Furthermore, American military aid 
towards Israel was never more generous than during the Obama administration (Sharp, 
2016: 1-2). At the same time, this unique support towards Israel has made cooperation 
with other allies in the Middle East much harder politically for the United States, and it 
strengthened anti-American sentiment in the region (Mersheimer et al, 2006: 32-34). 
Furthermore, it strengthened the position of Iran as it could paint itself as a defender of 
those perceived to be oppresed by Israel. 
 
After the Arab Spring: A half-hearted shift  
The Arab Spring confronted the United States with a set of new challenges in the region. 
One of the central initial questions the administration had to answer was whether to 
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support the aspirations of the revolutions or promote stability along the lines of decades 
of American policies. The Obama administration gave mixed responses with mixed 
results at best. It actively supported regime change in Libya without a clear follow-up 
strategy, and as a result Libya descended into chaos and also became a host for ISIS 
projecting instability throughout the region (Kuperman, 2015). In Egypt, after some initial 
uncertainty concerning its approach towards the upheaval in Cairo, the United States let 
go of the hands of President Mubarak. The decision was carefully followed by America’s 
allies in the region and triggered grave concerns especially in Saudi Arabia, a key ally of 
Mubarak (Rieger, 2013: 9). The lack of a firm approach towards the Muslim Brotherhood 
during its tenure in Egypt further strengthened these fears. However, it was the 
administration’s Syria policy which became the hallmark of President Obama’s Middle 
East strategy of restraint. The administration’s publicly declared intentions – “Assad must 
go”, “red lines” – were not in accordance with the basic decisions the administration took 
regarding the conflict (Kaplan, 2013). However, these public statements hardened the 
positions of the opposition and the rebel groups against the Assad regime in the initial 
stages of the conflict, while as time passed by, the gap between the rhetoric and the actual 
policy undermined US credibility. The uncertainty regarding US strategy also encouraged 
Russia’s entry into the conflict. Moscow’s military engagement was limited in size but 
was forceful enough to be effective, enhancing Russia’s leverage in the Middle East 
(Stepanova, 2016).  
The implications of US strategy on key alliances in the region also deserve 
attention, especially the ones toward Israel and Saudi Arabia. Although the strong US 
pressure on Iran and the “free-riding” of Israel and especially Saudi Arabia on American 
security guarantees had obvious benefits for these countries, they also had negative 
consequences on the long term. These two regional powers became accustomed to 
generous US support towards them, which decreased the pressure to make difficult 
choices or changes regarding key policy areas. In the case of Israel, there has been no 
urgent need to resolve the Palestinian issue, which could further isolate Israel on the 
international stage. In the case of Saudi Arabia, there was no pressure to engage Iran more 
pragmatically on regional security issues and to pursue much needed domestic reforms 
which would have produced a stronger, more resilient and confident Saudi Arabia. US 
policies may have fueled significant tensions with these key allies, thus politically 
weakening these alliances, and in the long term, they have also made their allies more 
vulnerable.         
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What is common in the above described US policies is that they at least partially 
reflect liberal interventionism and the strategy of primacy. Both of these concepts 
prescribe the maintenance of US hegemony in the Middle East (Mersheimer, 2011), with 
a strong emphasis on the use of military force and an uncompromising approach towards 
adversaries (Posen et al, 1996: 26-27, 32). The Iranian nuclear arrangement brokered in 
the summer of 2014 stands out from the above mentioned strategic developments. 
Contrary to the above mentioned strategic approaches the form and the substance of the 
Obama administration’s rapprochement towards Iran on the issue demonstrated realism 
and the strategy of selective engagement (Posen et al, 1996: 15-17). It focused on reaching 
pragmatic gains without pursuing too ambitious goals, and it was based on a proper 
assessment and acknowledgement of the balance of power in the region. Furthermore, the 
multilateral format of the P5+1 secured international legitimacy and maximized pressure 
on Iran.          
In summary, the above cited strategic decisions of the Bush and the Obama eras 
strengthened adversaries – Iran, Islamist extremists –, weakened the long-term position 
of allies and contributed to the unraveling of the regional order. Furthermore, there was a 
wide-spread perception of American disengagement and weakness during the Obama 
presidency. As a consequence the influence of the United States significantly weakened 
during this period, though it must be stated that other factors also contributed to this 
development. The underlying structural trends in the region – demographic shifts, 
economic challenges, scarce resources, climate change – and weak governance fueled 
internal instability, while the growing influence of emerging powers altered the calculus 
of regional actors. All these factors gradually undermined the US-led regional order.   
 
President Trump and “America First:” implications for the Middle East  
As a presidential candidate Donald Trump harshly criticized his predecessors’ Middle 
East policies. His criticism was centered around two main themes: the enormous costs 
and failures of the nation building projects on the one hand, and weakness shown towards 
adversaries on the other (Overhaus et al, 2016). In his perception, a strategy built on the 
concept of “America First” would scale back America’s commitments to the region, but 
would respond with overwhelming force to any threat perceived as vital for national 
security interests. 
Although Donald Trump has sketched up a more restrained presence in the Middle 
East, there are deeply embedded strategic and economic structural forces which indicate 
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that a quick and sharp departure from the region is not very likely. Three key pillars will 
likely remain cornerstones of US engagement towards the region: arms sales especially 
to partners in the Persian Gulf, a special relationship towards Israel backed up by strong 
domestic political forces in the US, and continued American interest in securing the 
uninterrupted flow of energy sources from the region.        
US arms sales agreements to the Middle East region were worth $54.6 billion USD 
between 2012 and 2015, with a significant amount of arms to be delivered in the coming 
years (Theorary, 2016: 14). As Donald Trump has emphasized the importance of keeping 
a strong manufacturing base at home, the defense industry is likely to play an important 
role in this respect, implying a need to secure export markets. The uncertain regional 
security environment also creates incentives for further arms exports. US–Israeli ties will 
likely remain strong in the coming years as US-based influential pro-Israeli political 
groups and a largely pro-Israeli Congress will still have considerable influence over the 
relationship. Despite the growing energy independence of the United States from the 
Middle East due to its increasing oil and gas output, the US still has an enormous stake 
in the stability of the international energy market. A major disruption in supply would 
significantly hurt not just the US economy, but also the economies of allies in Europe and 
Asia. Analyzing the statements and the perceptions of key actors in the new Trump 
administration concerning the region, the influence of these structural forces is visible in 
the developing new American Middle East strategy. 
The priority of American engagement will be counterterrorism. The 
administration will seek to defeat ISIS in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere in the region as soon 
as possible (Byman, 2016). The Trump administration has also indicated that it will not 
necessarily adhere to the departure of Assad. This policy is supported by Donald’s Trump 
promise that there will be no nation building projects and large scale military 
interventions. 
In this context there will be more leeway given to allies such as Israel, Egypt or 
the Arab monarchies in the Gulf concerning their controversial policies towards the issues 
of human rights or counterterrorism issues.  
The Trump administration’s likely forceful approach towards Iran could further 
strengthen relations with these allies. Despite promises given during the campaign that as 
President he would not respect the nuclear agreement (Lobrer, 2016) the new 
administration will likely not withdraw unilaterally from the deal. However, the long term 
durability of the arrangement is now more uncertain. President Trump’s first national 
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security advisor Michael Flynn (who remained in position until mid-February 2017) has 
stated that the administration has “put Iran on notice,” which foreshadows greater 
tensions ahead between Washington and Tehran (Flynn, 2017). Keeping the Persian Gulf 
stable and securing Israeli interests are the basic motivations behind the tough approach 
towards Iran.   
The strong supportive statements towards Israel indicate closer relationship 
between Washington and Tel Aviv than during the previous years. This will also mean 
that the US will continue to have to spend a lot of diplomatic capital in the region and on 
the international stage to defend its ally. It also implies maintaining a strong military 
deterrent in the region against Iran and continued aid for the Israeli military.  
The relationship with Turkey will also remain crucial in terms of US engagement 
towards the region. President Erdogan and the Trump administration might find common 
ground in confronting ISIS, but aligning policies on the future of Syria, Iraq and the Kurds 
will be a difficult exercise even though Turkey’s recent rapprochement with Russia might 
help this process (Mankoff, 2016). However, if Turkey’s recent overtures towards 
Moscow and Beijing are more strategic and Ankara’s commitment towards NATO and 
the West is further weakened, then such developments would negatively influence the 
relationship with Washington.  
However, there seems to be a major inconsistence within the Trump 
administration’s strategy towards the region. On a structural level, it wants to reduce 
American commitments in the region, while it still seeks to be respected as a powerful 
actor and sets ambitious objectives in the region. The main issues where this paradox 
might materialize are the conflicts between the containment of Iran and the 
administration’s Syria policy. Iran can only be contained effectively and allies in the Gulf 
could only be satisfied if the US applies great pressure on the Assad regime, Iran’s 
principal ally in the region. Furthermore, a robust and costly military presence in the 
region is also essential to implement the Iran strategy envisioned by the administration. 
If the Trump administration foregoes with a compromise with Russia and Iran on Syria 
that might severely affect Washington’s leverage with those allies who support the rebels. 
The Trump administration at some point will likely have to choose between his two 
contradicting objectives.   
Despite Donald Trump’s sharp criticism of the Obama administration’s Middle 
East policy, there is likely a lot of continuity between the approaches of the two 
administrations. The Obama administration was also pursuing an aggressive 
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counterterrorism strategy in the region, using drone strikes and special forces frequently 
and loosely. Short of a substantial increase of military presence on the ground in Iraq and 
Syria, which is unlikely, there is not much more the Trump administration can do to roll 
back ISIS. Prioritizing the fight against ISIS and remaining largely passive militarily 
against the Assad regime was also a feature of the Obama administration’s Syria policy. 
Concerning the relations with Israel there will be a lot of continuation in substance, 
especially with regards to the massive military aid the US has provided. The difference 
will be more on the political and diplomatic level, where even more American support is 
expected.          
 
Conclusions 
The flawed American strategy over the past fifteen years has accelerated the loss of 
influence of the United States in the Middle East. During his presidential campaign 
Donald Trump promised a major change in the US approach towards the region, on the 
one hand emphasizing the need for less costly American presence, at the same time 
envisioning a more forceful approach in confronting vital national security threats.  
However, despite the promise of change there will be likely a strong continuity in 
American strategy due to lasting structural elements of US engagement towards the 
region. Furthermore, the strategy envisioned by the Trump administration has conflicting 
objectives which cannot be achieved in parallel in the strategic landscape of today’s 
Middle East. Although it is possible to have overall less American engagement with more 
forceful short-term interventions, the latter approach carries serious risks of escalation. In 
the latter case the United States could easily repeat some of the mistakes of the past.         
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